Application challenges intervention powers of Law Society of England and Wales
The Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice in the U.K. has refused to give a former solicitor, who had previously been found to be a vexatious litigant, permission to reopen proceedings that had long been concluded.
On Mar. 26, 2019, a Divisional Court of the Administrative Court of the Queen’s Bench Division issued against the claimant an all proceedings order, which was a severe form of restraint for vexatious litigants. The order prohibited the claimant from initiating or continuing any civil proceedings without leave of the High Court, given her extensive history of litigation.
Last Aug. 13, the claimant filed an application with the Chancery Interim Applications Court. The application requested leave under s. 42(3) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 to bring new proceedings and to issue applications in numerous old proceedings. Specifically, she wanted to reopen 37 cases, most of which had already been resolved. Over 30 judgments had been issued involving her.
The claimant submitted three bundles of documents but failed to clarify whether she issued her application notice. The claimant’s unissued application notice named the Law Society of England and Wales and the Solicitors Regulation Authority as defendants. The claimant took issue with the Law Society’s intervention powers, granted by s. 35 of and Schedule 1 to the Solicitors Act 1974.
The judge adjourned the matter to Aug. 15 for further consideration. On that date, the claimant submitted additional documents and delivered a 30–40 minute oral submission to the judge.
Request to reopen denied
In Sheikh v The Law Society of England and Wales & Ors, [2024] EWHC 2185 (Ch) Rev 1, the High Court of Justice dismissed the application for total lack of merit and denied the claimant the leave that she requested.
The judge outlined the legal standard under s. 42(3), which required the court to decide whether the proceedings included reasonable grounds and did not abuse the court’s process. The judge considered the claimant’s submissions and documents and concluded that her application failed to meet these criteria.
The judge expressed concern that granting leave would “unleash a tidal wave” of litigation, including proceedings seeking to reopen long-settled cases. The judge held that the challenged decisions were final and that the claimant’s application lacked evidence to justify her claims and lacked reasonable grounds to bring new proceedings or to reopen already concluded litigation.
The jurisdiction to strike down or to revise the Law Society’s intervention powers belonged to the legislative branch, not to chancery judges, the judge noted.
The claimant seemed to “have lost all touch with reality and reason,” wrote Justice James Mellor for the court. The judge recommended that she “relinquish her obsession with the Law Society’s powers of intervention and to accept the final decisions which have been made against her.”
Additionally, the judge saw no substance in the claimant’s allegations of fraud and cruel and degrading treatment and rejected her conspiracy theories as “pure fantasy.”
