Court: this is one of the rare cases where it is apparent that the proposed appeal is hopeless
The Court of Appeal has upheld the High Court's decision to strike out a claim that psychiatry is "quackery."
In Carter v Capital and Coast District Health Board [2023] NZCA 466, John Carter sought declarations that psychiatry is quackery, that Parliament may not make quackery lawful, and that psychiatric treatment violated his son's common law rights as affirmed in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Acts 1990. Carter also sought damages for each day his son was unlawfully subjected to quackery under the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992.
The respondents, Capital and Coast District Health Board, Hutt Valley District Health Board, and the Attorney-General, applied to strike out the claim, citing reasons such as lacking a reasonably arguable cause of action, frivolousness, and abuse of process. The High Court ordered the striking out of the proceeding because it disclosed no reasonably arguable cause of action.
After failing to file an appeal within the prescribed period, Carter applied for an extension of time to appeal from the High Court judgment.
The Court of Appeal highlighted the origins of Carter's claim, rooted in the death of his son, which was ruled a suicide by the coroner in 2010. The court concluded that Carter's claim lacked a known cause of action. The court said it was unclear on what basis he sought declaratory relief. Specifically, the court couldn't consider the claim on the basis that psychiatry is "quackery," as there was no legal yardstick for such a determination.
Additionally, the court clarified its lack of jurisdiction to declare what Parliament may or may not make lawful, emphasising that Parliament is sovereign. The role of the courts is to apply the law as written by Parliament, having within contemplation Parliament's intent. A declaration that "Parliament may not make quackery lawful" is not a remedy that is within the court's power to grant.
The judge further pointed out that Carter's claim failed to identify specific acts or omissions that breached the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, and it appeared to rest solely on his assertions about the scientific merits of psychiatry as a medical discipline. The court found both the claim and Carter's submissions unintelligible. The court accepted the respondents' argument that Carter's standing to bring the lawsuit was doubtful.
The court noted that a decision to refuse an extension of time to file an appeal based substantially on the lack of merit of a proposed appeal should be made only where the appeal is clearly hopeless. An appeal would be hopeless, for example, where, on facts to which there is no challenge, it could not possibly succeed, where the court lacks jurisdiction, where there is an abuse of process, or where the appeal is frivolous or vexatious. The lack of merit must be readily apparent.
The court found that the decision of the High Court on the justiciability of Carter's claim was unimpeachable. The court said, "This was one of the comparatively rare cases where it is readily apparent that the proposed appeal against the strike-out decision crosses the hopeless threshold."
As a result, the court declined Carter's application for an extension of time to file an appeal.
